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THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN WATER CRISIS
by Juliette Niehuss*
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INTRODUCTION

hile the non-oil economy of the Middle East is largely agricultural, it is based in an arid, untamable
desert environment. Water is naturally scarce in the
region, and there has always been conflict over possession and
use of water resources. Recent history has shown that while
water supplies in the Middle East are limited, maldistribution
and overuse of water resources by Israel has aggravated development, and ultimately peace, between Israel and Palestine, and
the region as a whole. Specifically, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be attributed, in part, to disputes over scarce and valuable water resources of the Jordan River basin and its aquifers.
This article focuses on the legal implications of the water dispute between Palestine and Israel. The article first discusses current water conditions in the Palestinian Territories, including
Israeli water policies and the region’s unstable water resources.
The second part discusses regional and international agreements
regarding water-sharing and transboundary watercourses. The
third part examines the successes and failures of those mechanisms
in regard to Palestinian water access. Finally, the article describes
the effect that water disputes have on Palestine’s status as an occupied territory, as opposed to its status as a sovereign “state.”

WATER ACCESS AND CURRENT CONDITIONS IN
THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

Israel and Palestine are located in one of the most arid
regions in the world. Demand for water greatly exceeds nature’s
ability to recharge those resources. In fact, current water
recharge minimally sustains the demand. Israelis and
Palestinians use 2,570 million cubic meters (“mcm”) of water
per year combined, while the recharge rate does not exceed
2,634 mcm of water per year.1 This is a net gain of 64 mcm of
water per year as recharge rates continue to fall and overuse of
water has steadily decreased water supplies by approximately
1.6 mcm annually.2
Israel’s highly disproportionate use of the region’s water
supply exacerbates the current crisis in the region. Estimates
show that Israelis use four to six times as much water as
Palestinians.3 Additionally, Israeli water policies allow for distribution of only 50 to 70 cubic liters of water per day for each
Palestinian household,4 which is less than half of the 100 to 150
cubic liters recommended by the World Health Organization for
the minimum to average sanitary conditions necessary for
healthy living.5
Israel’s water policies have systematically worsened the
general health of the Palestinian population, as well as
Palestine’s economy, development, and overall infrastructure.
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Such policies include rationing Palestinian households’ access
to water, diverting Palestinian water sources for use by Israelis
and settlers, and preventing the drilling of additional wells in
Palestinian territories that would help to meet the rising demand
for water.6 These restrictions have forced Palestinians to use
unclean water for their daily uses, or to put off daily chores such
as washing food, cleaning dishes and utensils, and flushing toilets.7 Due to these restrictions, Palestinians are exposed to
water-borne diseases through lack of sanitary drinking or
bathing water,8 and some estimates show that over 60% of
Palestinians living in West Bank communities are infected with
diarrhea.9 Palestinian water, when accessible, is also highly salinated, causing kidney problems and hypertension in Gaza in
particular.10
Additionally, the Palestinian economy has been heavily
impacted by Israel’s water policies.11 Palestinian businesses are
affected by these policies on a regularly occurring basis, are
forced to rotate water access, and are unable to attract high-tech
or manufacturing industries because of this unpredictability.12 A
recent survey of water usage by the Palestinian Central Bureau
of Statistics shows that overall, 68% of Palestinians experience
loss of water at least twice weekly; in the Gaza Strip, this figure
jumps to 73% of Palestinians.13
In the Palestinian territories, groundwater (water that accumulates in underground acquifers and springs) is the primary
source of renewable water, whereas surface water in the Jordan
River and wadis (valleys) provide a far less rechargeable supply.
Studies by the Palestinian Water Bureau show that the majority
of rechargeable water for the Israel-Palestine region occurs
beneath Palestinian territories in the Mountain Aquifers, but
Palestinians are only allotted 17% of groundwater, 10% of the
runoff recharge, and none of the Jordan River recharge.14 It
should be noted that Palestinian usage is only 11% of the total
available water recharge, while Israeli usage is 89% of the total,
which includes all of the potential recharge of the Jordan River
waters.15 (See Figure 1 for more on water usage.)
Despite similarities in the size of their respective populations, Israelis consume over 85% of the region’s total water
resources even though Israelis and Israeli settlers make up only
68% of the population.16 In contrast, Palestinians comprise
32% of the region’s population, yet use only 11% of the region’s
water.17 Most alarming is the fact that each settler consumes
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600 liters of water per day, which is almost ten times as much as
Palestinians and nearly twice as much as the average Israeli
although settlers make up only 3% of the population.18

FIGURE 1: SOURCES OF WATER SUPPLY AND
TOTAL USE IN MILLION CUBIC METERS
ANNUALLY19

Israelis and Palestinians use the following water supplies:
The Jordan River Basin: including Lake Tiberias, the Dead
Sea, the Yarmuk and Zerka Rivers
The West Bank Mountain Aquifer: including the Coastal
Aquifer, the Western Aquifer, and the Northeastern Aquifer.
The Jordan River Basin, Western Aquifer and Northeastern
Aquifer are directly within the West Bank territories. The
Coastal Aquifer covers all of the Gaza Strip. Even though the
majority of the water supply is underneath Palestinian territory,
Israel has restricted Palestinian riparian rights and water access,
using all of the Coastal Aquifer waters to the detriment of the
Gaza Strip, and using most of the West Bank aquifers and all of
the Jordan River Basin to the detriment of West Bank territories.
A 1995 Applied Research Institute of Jerusalem (“ARIJ”)
survey of water allocation between Israel and Palestine showed
that Israel used at least three times as much water from the
Jordan River Basin and West Mountain Aquifer as Palestinians
were allowed. Specifically, the Jordan River waters have been
diverted by the Israeli National Water Carrier to irrigate settlements and agricultural lands in the Negev Desert, violating the
terms of the 1950s Johnston Plan and Palestine’s international
water rights as a riparian state of the Jordan River.
Although all of the recharge (or replenishing) areas of the
Mountain Aquifers are underneath Palestinian territories –
mainly the West Bank – Israel uses more than half of these
resources. As of 1995, Israel used 115 mcm per year from the
Northeastern Basin Aquifer, 325 mcm from the Western Basin,
and 65 mcm from the Eastern Basin. From those same aquifers,
Palestinians are only allocated 25 mcm, 25 mcm, and 60 mcm
per year, respectively.

HISTORIC WATER AGREEMENTS AND THEIR
APPLICATION TO THE CURRENT CONFLICT

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN AGREEMENTS

Palestine and Israel have addressed these water disputes in
a variety of past negotiations. The Johnston Plan, which was formulated by the United States in the 1950s and has become de
facto customary law in the region, proffered a proposal for equitable distribution of the Jordan River waters between the five
states sharing its banks: Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and
Palestine.20 The Gaza-Jericho Accord of 1994 led the
Palestinian Liberation Organization to formally recognize
Israel’s water policies in the Gaza Strip.21 The Accord stipulated that water resources in the Gaza Strip and Jericho would be
managed by the Palestinian Authority (“P.A.”), while existing
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supply systems for the settlements would continue to be managed by Merkorot, an Israeli water company, and that the P.A.
was not to interfere with such supplies.22 The 1993 Declaration
of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements23 laid
the groundwork for the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement
on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip of 1995.24 These
Agreements set out provisions on the goal of joint water management of the Occupied Territories. Article 40 of the Interim
Agreement’s Protocol Concerning Civil Affairs recognized
Palestinian water rights in the West Bank, although it made no
mention of the Gaza Strip Coastal Aquifer or Palestinian access
to the Jordan River.25
However, despite significant steps towards recognizing
Palestinian water rights through such bilateral agreements, the
water rights debate essentially has been ascribed the role of a
“final status” issue that will not be fully negotiated until the creation of a Palestinian state. One must, therefore, look to customary and international law that may provide support for
Palestinian water rights. While a range of international mechanisms provide moral and legal support for granting Palestinians
increased water rights, Palestine’s tenuous political status complicates the enforcement of these international laws on Israel.

INTERNATIONAL MECHANISMS AND CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW

The United Nations (“U.N.”) International Law
Commission and the non-governmental International Law
Association (“ILA”) have formulated a recognizable body of
international water law, addressing water rights to various
sources, including rivers, drainage basins, groundwater sources,
surface water sources, underwater aquifers, and other freshwater bodies. Internationally, there is also an increasing recognition of an inherent right to water, included in an expanded theory of fundamental human rights, such as the right to life and the
right to favorable living conditions.26 The World Health
Organization recently published a report on the right to water as
a fundamental human right,27 which it sees as deriving from
principles of health and sanitation put forth in Article 12(1) of
the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(“ICESR”),28 and more recently U.N. General Comment
No.15.29 In fact, over the last fifty years, a range of international conventions and decisions have addressed this fundamental
right to water and have increasingly provided support for
Palestine’s claim to water rights.

The Helsinki Rules

The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of
International Rivers (“Helsinki Rules”) establish that a “basin
state” is “entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an international drainage basin.”30 The Helsinki Rules were formulated and
adopted by the ILA in 1966 and are respected as customary international law.31
One primary principle of the Helsinki Rules suggests that a
riparian state, a state occupying land adjacent to a river system,
must obtain a “reasonable and equitable share” of that state’s
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water sources, including equal use of its rivers, drainage basins,
aquifers, and other ground- and sub-surface sources.32 Article
V(II) of the Helsinki Rules lists eleven factors that must be considered when determining if a riparian state possesses “a reasonable and equitable share” of their water sources, including
the past utilization of the waters, the economic and social needs
of the basin State, the population dependent on the waters, and
the availability of other resources.33
The Helsinki Rules also state that “a basin State may not be
denied the present reasonable use of the waters of an international drainage basin to reserve for a co-basin State future use of
such waters.”34 Interpreted broadly, this principle supports the
notion that Israel cannot deny Palestinian access to water for
Israel’s own future needs, either by preventing well drilling or by
diverting Jordan River flow. However, as noted, the Helsinki
Rules were drafted by the ILA, a private non-governmental
organization, and although respected within the international
community, are not legally binding on Israel’s actions.35

The Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses

Israel is legally bound by the Convention on the Law of
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (“the
Convention”).36 Israel signed the Convention in March 1989,
and ratified it in December of 1994. The Convention was adopted by the U.N. in 1997, and regulates the use of an “international watercourse” that is shared by two or more states.37
Specifically, the Convention regulates the non-navigational uses
of water resources such as rivers, basins, and sub- and groundwater systems. The Convention redefined water rights with the
consideration that international drainage basins are highly complex transnational systems that generally affect multiple
nations.38 The Convention also notes the right of a watercourse
or riparian state to be included in multilateral negotiations and
to be a party to watercourse agreements that will ultimately
affect its rights.39
The Convention focuses on two main principles of customary water law. The first is the “equitable and reasonable utilization” of watercourses,40 and the second is the “obligation not to
cause appreciable harm” to other states’ watercourses.41
Equitable and reasonable utilization establishes that each state
associated with an international drainage basin has an equal
right to the use of its waters.42 The “no appreciable harm” concept refers to a principle of property law, sic utere tuo it alienum
non laedas, discussed later in this article, that provides that one
state cannot cause detrimental harm to the property of its adjacent states.43 The Convention requires several factors be taken
into account when determining whether the reasonable and
equitable utilization of a watercourse, such as the watercourse
state’s social and economic needs, its population needs, conservation concerns, the effects of the use of water, and the availability of alternative uses of the watercourse.44 Moreover, the
Convention confers an obligation on watercourse states to “take
all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant
harm to other watercourse states,”45 and creates an obligation to
mitigate or eliminate harms when they do occur.46
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The Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste and
their Disposal

The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Waste and their Disposal47 (“Basel
Convention”), was ratified by Israel in 1994,48 and is binding
upon Israel’s actions. The Basel Convention establishes that ratified states have a right to prohibit the movement of hazardous
waste through its territories.
Pollution of Palestinian water sources by Israel is a common
occurrence and makes what little water is available for Palestinians
unsanitary and undrinkable. The Center for Economic and Social
Rights (“CESR”) notes that Israeli settlements are primarily to
blame, as they are six times more polluting than their Palestinian
neighbors.49 According to CESR, Israeli settlements located on
West Bank and Gaza Strip hilltops dump sewage and wastewater
into the Palestinian valleys below. Furthermore, Israeli industries
are increasingly relocating to West Bank hilltops to avoid strict
Israeli environmental regulations. Over 200 of these industries
dump factory effluents and waste directly onto Palestinian agricultural land.50 CESR also notes that in 2001, the Israeli government
discharged 3.5 million cubic meters of untreated wastewater into
the Gaza Strip.51 This continued pollution is in direct violation of
the Basel Convention. However, Israel argues that because the
Palestinian Territories are not a sovereign state, such instruments
as the Helsinki Rules and the Basel Convention do not apply to the
current dispute even though they are international instruments
designed to bind Israel.52

PALESTINIAN WATER RIGHTS UNDER CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW

The international treaties and conventions discussed above
all refer to watercourse “states,” the protection of “state” sovereignty, territorial integrity, and immovable borders. Israel has
always qualified Palestine’s claim of water rights by arguing that
the Palestinian Territories do not yet constitute an independent
and sovereign “state” for the purposes of binding or customary
international law. Israel further argues that since Palestine is not,
and never has been, a sovereign state, international human rights
and customary law provisions do not apply, and therefore
Palestine does not have independent riparian rights.53
Many legal sources and scholars, however, disagree with
Israel’s determination, and recognize that Palestine is a riparian
to the rivers that run through it.54 They argue that recent history indicates the international community, which includes Israel
and Palestine, are preparing for a future independent Palestinian
state. Even the U.N. has recently acknowledged as much by
passing a resolution with a “vision” of Palestinian and Israeli
states living side by side.55 Therefore, some feel that the nonState argument is merely a delay tactic, and a virtual non-issue.
On a more fundamental level, customary international law dictates that Palestine has rights as a riparian state and should be
afforded inherent international and human rights to the aquifers
under their territory as well as the Jordan, Yarmuk, and Zerka
rivers that flow through the territories.
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

RIPARIAN RIGHTS AND CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW

Under customary international law, riparian states are states
that “arise as an incident of ownership to land adjacent [to a]
river;”56 riparian states have inherent rights to the water that
adjoins their land. Riparian rights are derived from property
principles and generally include the rights to fish, to use and
receive water in its natural state, and to sue when water is diverted, polluted, or otherwise harmed by upstream users.57
Although riparian law is essentially derived from English common law nuisance,58 it is an internationally recognized principle
that riparians own or occupy land adjacent to rivers, and therefore, have a say in how its
waters are used. There are two
main principles at the core of
riparian law. First, riparians
have rights to the use of “unaltered water.”59 Second, riparians do not have sovereign or
absolute rights to use common
waters in any manner they
wish.60 These principles stem
from the ancient property principle of sic utere tuo it alienum
non laedas,61 which maintains
that a riparian cannot use its
property in a manner which
would injure the property rights
of its neighbor.62
Under riparian principles,
the Jordan River should be equitably allocated between all of its
rightful parties.63 Palestine and
Israel are downstream riparians
of the Jordan River. The U.N.
has promulgated its own interpretation of riparian rights through
General Assembly Resolution No. 3281.64 These riparian rights
include the following concepts:

phrase “watercourse state.” Yet the governing law retained the
basic language of the U.N. resolution, focusing on the rule that
a riparian state should not substantially or significantly harm the
rights of other riparian states.66
There are two notable international cases regarding the
application of riparian principles to disputes over river usage. A
recent case between Hungary and Slovakia under the
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”)67 affirmed the principle of
“equitable utilization” as presented in the Helsinki Rules. In this
case, the ICJ had to decide on the legality of a treaty involving
an agreement for a joint building of the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros
Barrage System on a section of the Danube between Hungary
and then Czechoslovakia. In 1989, Hungary terminated its
duties under the treaty, and in
response, the then newly
formed Slovakia dammed up a
portion of the Danube and substantially diverted its waters
away from Hungary. The ICJ
found that although Hungary
violated its legal obligations in
terminating the treaty, it had not
given up its “basic right to an
equitable and reasonable sharing of the resources of an international watercourse,” and that
Slovakia had committed “an
international wrongful act.”68
The other case involved a
1957 dispute between France
and Spain69 and applied the sic
utere tuo doctrine to an arbitral
dispute over France’s use of
Lake Lanoux. This use required
the diversion of water from
Lake Carol to Lake Ariège.
Spain claimed rights as a co-riparian of both rivers, and while
the arbitration tribunal upheld France’s rights to divert the
rivers, it also acknowledged “the correlative duty not to injure
the interests of a neighbouring state” and the principle that “no
substantial change can be brought about by one riparian without
the consent of co-riparians.”70

The primary problem with
using international law
and riparian principles to
support Palestinian water
rights is that Palestinian
Territories may not
qualify as a “state,” and
thus, may not fall under
the purview of
international water law.

• Upper riparian states do not have absolute sovereign

rights, but have sovereign rights in their respective
territories over the waters of the international watercourse;

• In their use of water, states should not infringe upon

the legal interests of the other riparian states
(expressed by various terms in the Convention, such
as Article 5/1);

• In their utilization of water, riparian states should not

substantially harm the other riparian states; this
notion is encompassed under the phrase “not to cause
significant harm” in the Convention, Article 7.65

These principles have been incorporated into the
Convention on the Non-Navigational Use of Watercourses. In
the Convention, the term “riparian” was replaced with the
WINTER 2004

OBSTACLES TO PALESTINE’S FULL RECOGNITION
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

The primary problem with using international law and riparian principles to support Palestinian water rights is that
Palestinian Territories may not qualify as a “state,” and thus, may
not fall under the purview of international water law. The question thus remains whether the Palestinian Territories qualify as a
“riparian” for the purposes of claiming independent access to
waterways which also flow through parts of Israel. As noted previously, the argument can be made that because Palestine will
likely become a state, international laws should apply to the
water conflicts between Israel and Palestine. Gamal Abouali
notes Israel’s argument that because international law “regulates
16

the relation between states and individuals,” it does not apply to
the Occupied Territories as its relation to Israel “differs from that
of democratic systems.”71 This argument follows Israel’s position on the Geneva Conventions, the ICESCR, and the laws of
belligerent occupation. Ironically, Abouali notes that the Israeli
Supreme Court has rejected this argument, finding instead that
Israel is a belligerent occupier and must comply with international human rights laws set forth in the Geneva Conventions,
the Hague Regulations, and presumably, other human rights and
humanitarian laws.72 Finally, the 2002 U.N. resolution recognizing the vision of a Palestinian state provides additional reinforcement to the notion that Israel must comply with international norms in its water policies towards the territories.
A secondary obstacle to full recognition of Palestinian water
rights is Israel’s justifiable need for “national security.”73 Israel
justifies a range of its policies towards Palestine, including its
diversion of needed water sources and inequitable distribution of
existing waters, by focusing on the security elements involved,
which in this case refers to “water security.”74 Israel claims that
water pipelines and wells in the Palestinian territories are frequent targets of terrorist attacks and that Palestinians often
“steal” water meant for other communities in the Occupied
Territories.75 Furthermore, Israel is, perhaps reasonably, concerned about the continuation of its own water sources as Israel
is also an arid desert and suffers chronic water shortages of its
own.76 Thus, Israel’s water policies towards the Palestinian territories are guided, in part, by a need for self-preservation.
Finally, in all of the negotiations between Israel and the
Palestinian authorities, Palestinian water rights have been consistently labeled as a “final status negotiations” issue.77 Such
issues, like the right of return for refugees and border questions,
will not be negotiated until a final settlement of the entire IsraelPalestine crisis is near completion. This semantic ambiguity has
made any solid agreement ineffective, especially in regards to
protecting Palestinian water rights to the Jordan River and the
Mountain Aquifers, or in regards to water distribution and
access. The “final status” label is a persistent delay tactic, which
excuses current practice with the hope of imminent solution.
However, this ambiguity has served to make a final resolution to
the question of Palestine’s right to water practically impossible.

CONCLUSION

The essence of the debate over Palestinian water rights
involves the following questions, addressed above: 1) whether
international laws and norms support the expansion of
Palestinian access to joint Palestinian-Israeli water resources; 2)
whether Palestine’s status as a non-state prevents the application
of international laws to the Palestinian-Israeli water dispute; and
3) whether the prospect of a future Palestinian state should
require that international water laws apply to the dispute regardless of Palestine’s current status.
The issue of Palestinian water rights is ambiguous and open
to interpretation from all sides. It is largely accepted that human
rights and humanitarian law should apply to the Palestinian
Territories as a peoples under the control of Israel. Yet, whether
17

customary water laws that normally apply to sovereign riparian
states should also apply to the occupied territories is a harder
question to answer. As discussed above, a range of international principles support the notion that customary water laws
should apply.
First, customary international norms set forth in documents
such as the Helsinki Rules, the Basel Convention, and the
Convention on Non-Navigational Uses of transboundary watercourses require that a riparian be given a reasonable and equitable share or utilization of its waters and that riparians not
cause appreciable harm to neighboring riparian states. These
two principles support Palestine’s access to sources such as the
Jordan River, and Palestine’s right to clean and sanitary water
that is not polluted by industrial effluent and settler wastewater.
Second, the sic utere tuo doctrine has applied not only to
sovereign states, but also to individual disputes between communities and thus, could be extended to the Palestinian territories as a community within Israel. This principle permeates
throughout all customary international water law and is binding
on Israel in the form of the Convention on the Law of NonNavigational Uses of International Watercourses.
Finally, these doctrines are supported not only by binding
and non-binding international documents but also by decades of
international case law. The Hungary v. Slovakia case affirmed a
riparian’s right to the “equitable utilization” of a waterway, and
the France v. Spain case affirmed the application of sic utere tuo
to the diversion of a waterway away from its rightful riparian.
Most recently, the inherent right to water has been recognized by the ILA’s Berlin Conference Rules of 2004 (the “Berlin
Rules”), a controversial new set of international water laws.
Attempting to consolidate over forty years of water law developments since the Helsinki Rules, the Berlin Rules go beyond
customary focus on international drainage basins and incorporates rules regarding national waters as well. Although this
expanded scope has not, at this point, been accepted by the
majority of international water law practitioners, the ILA’s
adoption of these stances gives some additional support in
applying the international water principles discussed above to
the internal disputes between Palestine and Israel.
This article has surveyed the range of international laws in
the continuing debate over recognition of expanded water rigts
for Palestine. Customary international laws favor recognition of
these rights, despite Palestine’s ambiguous and unique status as
an occupied territory. Application of these laws indicates that, if
the final status issues preventing negotiation over water access
can be resolved, Palestine should be given greater control over
the use of waters located within its territory, as well as access to
additional water sources currently prohibited by Israel’s
inequitable water policies.

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

ENDNOTES:

The Legal Implications of the Israeli-Palestinian Water Crisis
1Water and Environment, PALESTINE FACTS, ch. 7, at 276 (PASSIA, July
2004), available at http://www.passia.org/palestine_facts/pdf/pdf2004/7Water-Environment.doc (last visited Oct. 31, 2004).
2 Id.

3 Jad Isaac, Water and Palestinian-Israeli Peace Negotiations, POLICY
BRIEF, NO. 4 (Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine 1999) (claiming
that in 1999 Israelis consumed more than four times as much water as
Palestinians), available at
http://www.palestinecenter.org/cpap/pubs/19990819pb.html (last visited
Nov. 2, 2004); see also Praful Bidwai, Dispossessed, Defrauded in One’s
own Land , THE HINDU, May 6, 2004 (noting that the average Israeli consumes 350 litres a day, which is around six times more than the
Palestinians’ 50-70 liters per day), available at
http://www.tni.org/archives/bidwai/dispossesed.htm; see also Not Even a
Drop: The Water Crisis in Palestinian Villages Without a Water Network,
Information Sheet, B’TSELEM, July 2001 (noting that the average Israeli
uses six times as much water as the average West Bank resident), available at http://www.fromoccupiedpalestine.org/node.php?id=614 (last visited Nov. 5, 2004).
4 Sharing Water in the West Bank, GEOTIMES, Dec. 2000, available at
http://www.geotimes.org/dec00/westbank.html (noting that Palestinians’
water use is an average of 50 liters per capita per day, only half of the
minimum 100 liters recommended by the World Health Organizations);
see also

The Sixth Gulf Water Conference, Amjad Aliewi & Geoff Parkin,
Towards A Sustainable Management of the Palestinian Water Resources
(Mar. 8 –12, 2003) (noting that Palestinian use is approximately 70 liters
a day compared to the WHO recommendation of an average of 150 liters
per day and the CESR finding that 100 liters is the absolute minimum).
5 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION Guidelines on Technologies for Water

Supply Systems in Small Communities (1993).
6 See e.g., P.A. Rejects Israeli Water Proposal; Crisis Feared, MIDDLE

EAST NEWSLINE, June 22, 1999, available at
http://waternet.rug.ac.be/shortage/IPfollow-up.htm (last visited Nov. 4,
2004).
7 See Laura King, Water Issue Percolates as Another Threat to Mideast

Peace, ASSOCIATED PRESS, August 8, 1999, available at
http://waternet.rug.ac.be/shortage/IPfollow-up.htm (last visited June 21,
2004)
8 See The Right to Water in Palestine: A Background, FACT SHEET
(CESR, Brooklyn, NY), Apr. 11, 2003, at 2, available at
http://cesr.org/node/view/451 (last visited Nov. 2, 2004).
9 Id.
10 Supra note 7.

11 See Water a Vexed Issue for Israel, Palestinians, JORDAN TIMES, July

7, 2000, available at http://waternet.rug.ac.be/shortage/IPfollow-up.htm
(last visited June 21, 2004).
12 Id.

13 Percentage of Households in the Palestinian Territory by Changes
That Emerged on Water Resources Within the Last Five Years and Region
2003, SURVEY OF WATER RESOURCES AND ITS EFFECTS ON HOUSEHOLDS
LIVING CONDITIONS AND IN THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORY 2003 (Palestinian
Central Bureau of Statistics), available at
http://www.pcbs.org/water_resources/
tab8.aspx (last visited Nov. 5, 2004).

WINTER 2004

14 Supra note 1, at 1.
15 Id.

16 Gamal Abouali, Natural Resources Under Occupation: The Status of
Palestinian Water Under International Law, 10 PACE INT’L L. REV. 411,
474 n.332 (1998) (noting that Israel consumes 85% of joint IsraeliPalestinian water resources); see also CESR 2003, supra note 8, at 1.
17 Supra note 8, at 1; see also, PALESTINE FACTS, supra note 1, at 276.
18 Supra note 8, at 1.

19 See Walid Sabbah & Jad Issac, Towards a Palestinian Water Policy
(Applied Research Institute-Jerusalem, June 1995), available at
www.arij.org/pub/Towards%20a%20Palestinian%20Water%20Policy.pdf,
(last visited Nov. 2, 2004).
20 See supra note 16, at 537 (noting that the Johnston Plan, although not

formally adopted by any of the river’s riparians, serves as de facto customary law for the basin and remains the basis for all water negotiations
between Israel and Jordan).
21 See generally Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area
(“Gaza-Jericho Accord”), May 4, 1994, Isr.-PLO, available at
http://www.usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/peace/peaindex.htm. The
Accord paved the way for the establishment of the Palestinian Authority
and the formulation of “Oslo II” Interim Agreement in 1995.
22 See id., at Annex II, Protocol Concerning Civil Affairs, Art.

2(B)(31)(a)-(d).
23 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, ,
Sept. 13, 1993, Isr.-PLO, available at http://www.jmcc.org/research/
series/dop.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).
24 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement On The West Bank And The

Gaza Strip, Sept. 28, 1995, Isr.-PLO, available at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/interimtoc.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).
25 Id., Annex III, art. IV, app. I, art. 40, available at http://www.jew-

ishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/iaannex3.html (last visited Nov. 3,
2004); see also supra note 16, at 560-562 (discussing that while the
Interim Agreement superseded both the Jericho Accord and the
Declaration of Principles provisions on joint water management, it failed
to award additional water resources or protections for Palestinians in the
West Bank, and continued to exclude potential Palestinian access to
waters of the Jordan River in violation of international transboundary
water law).
26 See e.g., International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights, G.A.
RES. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., at Article 11(1), U.N. Doc. A/6316

(1966) (noting the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living)
[hereinafter ICESCR]; See also General Comment No. 15, U.N.
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/2002/11, Nov. 26, 2002, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/gc15.doc (last visited Nov. 3, 2004)
(commenting on Articles 11 and 12 of the ICESCR, the right to water,
and noting that access to clean water is a human right) [hereinafter
General Comment].
27 See generally WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE RIGHT TO WATER
(February 2003), available at
http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/rightowater/en/ (last visited
Nov. 5, 2004).
28 ICESR, supra note 26, at art. 12(1) (recognizing “the right of every-

one to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health”).
ENDNOTES: The Legal Implications Continued on page 76

18

ENDNOTES: THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS Continued from page 18
29 See General Comment, supra note 26.

30 INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, HELSINKI RULES ON THE USES OF
THE WATERS OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS, 52nd Conference, Helsinki, 1966,
at Ch. 2, Article IV, available at http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/
IntlDocs/Helsinki_Rules.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).
31 See id.

32 See id. at arts. V,VII.
33 See id. at art. V(II)(4)-(6), (8).

34 See supra note 30, at art. VII (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).

35 See Jad Isaac, Core Issues of the Palestinian-Israeli Water Dispute,

(Applied Research Institute-Jerusalem, 1994), available at
http://www.arij.org/pub/corissues/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).
36 Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational uses of International

55 U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 1397, Mar. 12, 2002; see also

Sarah Left, U.N. Security Council Backs Palestinian State, GUARDIAN
UNLIMITED, Mar. 13, 2002, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel
/Story/0,2763,666617,00.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
56 Terence P. Douglas, Sources of Aboriginal Water Rights in Canada,
available at http://www.firstpeoples.org/land_rights/Canada/
summary_of_land_rights/water_rughts.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
57 See id.
58 Supra note 42.
59 Supra note 42.

60 See Yuskel Inan, The Law of International Water Courses and the

Middle East, 5 J. INTL. AFF. 2 (2000), available at
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/V-2/yinan.htm (last visited Nov. 5,
2004).
61 See Transboundary Water Resources, supra note 42, § 2.3.

Watercourses, United Nations International Law Commission, G.A. RES.
51/229, U.N. Doc. A/51/869, May 21, 1997, available at
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/nonnav.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).
37 Id.

62 See e.g., supra note 42 (citing to a New York case from the turn of the

40 See supra note 36, at pt II, arts. 5(1), 6(1).

64 U.N. General Assembly Resolution No. 3281, 1974 (concerning the

38 See supra note 16, at 538-39.
39 See supra note 36, at art. 4(1), (2).

41 See supra note 36, at art. 7(1); see e.g., JUKKA ILOMÄKI, INSTITUTIONAL

CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPING TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RESOURCES,
Transboundary Water Resources in International Law, § 2.7 (Dec. 1999),
available at http://www.water.hut.fi/wr/research/glob/pubications/
Ilomaki/table.html, (last visited Nov. 3, 2004) [hereinafter Transboundary
Water Resources].
42 See id.

century in which the court granted an injunction against a salt factory
which had contaminated a local creek community, Strobel et al. v. Kerr
Salt Co., 164 N.Y. 303, 320 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1900)).
63 See supra note 16, at 537-538.
“Economic Rights and Duties of States.”)
65 Supra note 60.

66 See generally Convention, supra note 36, arts. 4-8.
67 Case Concerning the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v.

Slovakia), 1997 I.C.J. 92 (Sept. 25), available at
http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/library/cijwww/icjwww/idocket/ihs/ihsframe.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2004).
68 Id. at paras 78, 110.

43 ELIZABETH BRUEKBAKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE DEFENCE OF
NATURE, Without Obstruction, Diversion or Corruption, ch. 3 n.64, available at http://www.environmentprobe.org/enviroprobe/pridon/chapter3.html
(last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
44 See supra note 36, at art. 6 (1)(a)-(g).

69 Lac Lanoux Arbitration (Spain v. France), 12 R.I.A.A. 281; 24 I.L.R.

47 The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Waste and their Disposal, UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT
PROGRAMME, Conference on the Pleipotentiarites, March 22, 1989, available at http://www.basel.int/text/con-e.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2004).
48 Israel ratified the Basel Convention on April 12, 1994. See

supra note 42, at § 2.3, and Sovereignty versus the Environment, id. at 224.
71 Supra note 16, at 498.

45 Supra note 36, at art. 7(1).
46 Supra note 36, at art. 7(2).

http://www.ban.org/about_basel_conv/2000.pdf.
49 See supra note 8, at 2.
50 See supra note 8, at 2.
51 Supra note 8, at 2.

52 See supra note 35.

53 See e.g., supra note 16, at 498 (stating that Israel’s argument that
“since no sovereign state had legitimate title to the territories occupied by
it in 1967, international law that presupposes the existence of an ousted
sovereign does not apply.”)
54 See e.g., supra note 16, at 537; see also supra note 35; see also supra

101 (Nov. 16, 1957), available at
http://www.dal.ca/~wwwlaw/kindred.intllaw/Lanoux.htm. See also
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, International Environmental Law:
Sovereignty versus the Environment?, ch. 8, at 224 (1995), available at
http://www.ub.rug.nl/eldoc/dis/jur/n.j.schrijver/h8.pdf (last visited
November 3, 2004) [hereinafter Sovereignty versus the Environment].
70 Id. For more on this case, see also Transboundary Water Resources,
72 See Supra note 16, at 498.
73 See supra note 35.
74 See supra note 35.

75 See e.g., Water War Leaves Palestinians Thirsty, BBC NEWS, June 16,
2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2982730.stm
(last visited June 21, 2004) [hereinafter Water War]; see also, P.A.
Rejects, supra note 7.
76 See Water War, supra note 75.
77 See supra note 35.

note 19.

WINTER 2004

76

